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In  China,  collective  disputes  on  unlawful  dismissal
compensation  resulted  from  lock-out  or  workplace
relocation  are  increasing.  However  a  reasonable




game  model,  and  draw  the  conclusion  that  it  is  risk
preference  of  bargaining  pari t ies   impacts   the
compensatory amount.
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due  to  workplace  relocation,  such  as  Hisense  Kelon
Electrical Holdings Co., Ltd. (Shunde) and Fanyu Lide
Footwear  Co.  or  cases  of  cut  off  workers  due  to  poor
performance, such as Deyang Second Heavy Machinery
Group and Nokia (Suzhou), compensation standard is the
focus  of  controversy.  It  is  surprising  that  the  actual





so,  author  would  like  to  explore  what  an  appropriate
compensatory  criteria  should  be  through  theoretical
research.
 
1 .   S Y S T E M  F O R  U N L A W F U L
DISMISSAL COMPENSATION
Referring to the regulations in Convention Concerning
Termination  of  Employment  at  the  Initiative  of  the
Employer (C158) that employment of workers should not




with  morality  implication)  or  incompatible  with  legal
procedure are regarded as unlawful dismissals.
The  core  of  regulation  of  unlawful  dismissal  is  to
prevent employers from abusing dismissal right so as to
maintain workers’ job stability expectancy (employment




interests  in  employment  contract  due  to  wrongful
dismissal. Generally, there are three measures to remedy
unlawful dismissal, that is, reinstateme1, re-engagement2
and  financial  compensation  respectively.  From  the
international perspectives, paying financial compensation
is the mainstream remedy methods nowadays.
Commonly,  the  following  factors  should  be
cons idered   to  de te rmine  employer ’   f inanc ia l
compensation responsibility, such as, the residual working
ages included in workers’ existing employment contracts;
workers’  wage  and  benefit  income;  employers’  or
1  Reinstatement  means  that  employer  resumes  original  work  of
workers unlawful dismissed.
2  Re-engagement  means  that  employer  gives  workers  unlawful
dismissed other similar work.














these  factors,  some  of  them  may  leave  employers
undertaking extra responsibility (for example, employer






Since  various  comprehension,  there  are  obvious
differences  among  national  regulations  on  unlawful
dismissal compensation. Except Germany, other nations
listed in Table 1, such as America, England, France, Japan
and China,  regulates  in  its  law that  employers  should
compensate  the  relevant  workers  for  unfulfilled  wage








employment  contract  but  is  bound  to  severance  pay
related with fulfilled contractual ages and without ceiling







of  many  developed  countries,  which  imposing  more
several sanctions on employer unfairly.
 
2.  A CASE OF UNLAWFUL DISMISSAL
COMPENSATION IN CHINA
Regulations on compensation of unlawful dismissal  in
Chinese  law  is  too  simple  and  severe  to  imply  many
unreasonable provisions in it. Just look at compensatory
standard, the compensation level even exceed the level of








Comparison of L Dismissal Compensation Regulations

















































of   compensa t ion  o f  100  workers  would  be
RMB1 , 7 2 9 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 ,   RMB2 8 8 , 2 0 0 . 0 0   a n d
RMB576,400.00  respectively,  which  indicate  a  huge
gap.  So  in  this  case,  both  of  bargaining  agents
representing employers and workers respectively didn’t








for  each  full  year;  m* is  “monthly  wage”  means  the
worker’s average monthly wage for the 12 months prior





It  is  a  typical  case  among  collective  disputes  for
unlawful  dismissal  caused  by  lock-out  or  factory
relocation. There are two traits. Firstly, the psychological
bargaining strategy space and actual one are both deviated




Pay, is  too high to lose its  instructive.  The underlying
causes  of  this  situation  lie  in  distorted  reflection  of
compensatory formation mechanism in Labor Contract
Law  of  PRC,  which  could  not  form  an  appropriate





3 .   A N A L Y S I S  O N  U N L A W F U L
DISMISSAL COMPENSATION BASED ON




Hereinafter  a  cooperative game model  will  be used to
simulate the process of unlawful dismissal compensatory
game.  Under  this  model,  there is  a  binding agreement
between employers and workers, that is, the compensatory
amount  should  not  exceed  ω( ,  mk  is  a




in  which a  optimal  partition point  representing Pareto
efficiency  is  contained.  S={(s1,s2  )│0≤si≤ω,s1+s2≤ω}
(i=1,2)  (s1  is  employer’s  gain  from  bargaining;  s2  is
worker's gain from bargaining). On the other side of coin,
there  is  also  a  utility  alternatives,  “u”,  containing  a
optimal  partition  point  representing  equity  criterion,
u=(u1, u2 ) (u is the expected utility of the two sides; u1 is




u1 = u1 (s1) = s1 ;
workers generally appear risk aversion, we use a power
function to express their utility natures, let
u2 = u2 (s2) = sb2 ;
(b is risk preference coe±cient ; b < 1):
To work out the optimal solution of unlawful dismissal
compensatory amount,  we have to  solve a  problem of
nonlinear optimization:
max u1u2
s:t : s1+ s2 = :
From above assumption, we have








b ¡ u¤1b( ¡ u¤1)
b¡1 = 0 ;
u¤1 =
1


















Comparison  of  Compensation  in  Three  Different
Biding Pattern




















a  bargaining  strategy  with  very  higher  expected
bargaining breakdown risk and higher expected revenue.
In the case of Nokia (Suzhou), workers’ agent firstly
bid  at  (N+2)m*  and  chose  a  strategy  with  higher
bargaining breakdown risk due to strike. At last, (N+1)m*
was agreed with additional shopping card of 100 yuan for




The  unlawful  dismissal  compensation  is  actually
determined on a cooperative game mechanism within an
estimated  interval.  The  amount  of  compensation  is
prominently impacted by risk preference of bargaining
parties. The more risk averse workers are, the smaller the
compensatory  amount  is;  contrarily,  the  higher.  In
addition, employers are always get a higher proportion of
share  from ω  because  of  their  higher  risk  preference,
which makes amount of workers’ compensation tend to
the lower limit of estimated interval. Therefore, we can
draw  a  further  conclusion  that  it  is  against  the  basic
formation principle of unlawful dismissal compensation
to  pay  for  wrongful  discharge  at  twice  the  rate  of
Severance Pay; statutory compensation standard could not
be proved to be reasonable through theoretical simulation.
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